22
April 2003
2. "Turkey’s Iraq odyssey ends in tragedy", for the last 10 years, Turkey has been busy building a new reality in northern Iraq and in the country altogether to avoid negative consequences similar to those that came to light after the 1991 Gulf War.
3. "Turkish Cypriots open borders", the authorities in the breakaway Turkish north of Cyprus have announced that they will open access to the Greek Cypriot part of the island after nearly 30 years of enforced separation.
4. "US warned to keep out of Turkey's EU talks", Turkey's hopes of early entry to the European Union risk being damaged by interference from the US, according to Gunter Verheugen, the EU's enlargement commissioner.
5. "Turkey's FM admits snags in Azeri-Turkish pipeline project", problems over land expropriation and taxes in Turkey are holding up work
6. "Turkish FM: No plans for annexation", in Ankara, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, stressed yesterday that efforts to solve the Cyprus problem would continue.
1. - The Los Angeles Times - "Kurds Pose a Moment of Truth for Turkey, U.S.":
How the two nations handle this discontented minority will play a large part in the region's future.
by Graham E. Fuller / April 21, 2003
Unresolved tensions between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds are forcing Washington to choose sides between our vital strategic ally in Ankara and our long-standing moral obligation to protect Iraq's Kurds. Beneath this dispute lies a much more fateful question: What kind of rights should ethnic minorities enjoy in the modern world?
On the one hand, the Iraqi Kurds were corralled by the British into the new state of Iraq after World War I, separated from their Kurdish brethren in Turkey, Syria and Iran. They are fed up with brutal rule from Baghdad and would like to be independent, although they recognize that's probably not realistic at this juncture.
On the other hand, there's Turkey, which, despite its extraordinary odyssey toward becoming a modern, Westernized and democratic state, still reverts to old anxieties and fears as it looks south at this part of Iraq, once part of its empire.
Turkey has its own Kurds, who make up 20% of the Turkish population and who yearn for recognition of their existence and cultural rights and for some degree of autonomy over their local affairs. Yet many Turks -- including parts of the security establishment and members of nationalist groups -- believe that any such concessions would lead down a slippery slope to the division of Turkey.
In dealing with its own Kurds, Turkey has operated from the start on the 19th century notion that "nation-states" must ensure national homogeneity by imposing nationwide assimilation. The state ignored and even denied the existence of the Turkish Kurds and banned them from public use of their native language or traditional clothes in an effort to create a "purely Turkish" state.
The Turks even fought a bloody counterinsurgency war against Kurdish separatist rebels that started in 1984; they largely defeated the rebels, but the Kurdish region was left smoldering.
Today, as Ankara looks across the border into Iraq, it sees another group of Kurds making a bid to entrench Kurdish autonomy in a new Iraqi constitution and poised to take over Kirkuk's oil wealth to fund Kurdish nationalist ambitions. This echoes ominously across Turkey.
Turks have historical memories of Europeans inciting ethnic rebellions within the multiethnic Ottoman Empire. Some fear Washington is now "punishing" Turkey for denying military bases to the U.S. during the war by letting the Iraqi Kurds have their way.
Rather than let this happen, Turkey has massed thousands of troops on the Iraqi border, threatening to march in if its interests are jeopardized.
But the Turks' fear about their Kurdish population is largely misplaced and betrays a deep lack of self-confidence. In reality, Turkey's Kurds seek only recognition of their existence as a people and some cultural, linguistic and local administrative rights. To give Turkey credit, in the last decade it has made some modest progress toward recognizing some of these aspirations as it works toward European Union membership.
The Ankara government now faces a moment of truth.
Ironically, if it were to choose this moment to expand the rights of its own Kurds, that would actually leave it largely impervious to what happens in Iraq. It is only the Turks' failure to meet the cultural needs of their own Kurds that renders them vulnerable to events in northern Iraq and constantly open to manipulation by Turkey's regional opponents.
The emergence of Kurdish authority in Iraq, and even control of Kirkuk, however politically sensitive, is a fait accompli. As much as Turkey would love to roll back the clock to 1991 in northern Iraq, Turkey's strength will lie in working with the realities of the new Iraq and not against it.
The U.S. and Turkey are now actually dealing with more of the unfinished business of the colonial legacy of the Middle East. Will Iraqi Kurds accept the British-imposed forced marriage with the Arab region to the south? Can Iraq ever function comfortably as a modern, multiethnic and multi-religious state without another Saddam Hussein to enforce it?
These are the grand questions that Washington has inherited.
(Graham E. Fuller is former vice chairman of the National Intelligence
Council at the CIA and author of "The Future of Political Islam,"
just released by Palgrave Macmillan.)
2. - The Daily Star (Lebanon) - "Turkey’s Iraq odyssey ends in tragedy":
18 April 2003
For the last 10 years, Turkey has been busy building a new reality
in northern Iraq and in the country altogether to avoid
negative consequences similar to those that came to light after the
1991 Gulf War.
That was why Ankara established strong economic links with Baghdad
and a permanent military presence in northern Iraq. The Turks fell
into the habit of sending their troops over the border to chase rebel
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters, as well as to dissuade
the Kurds from even thinking of founding their own independent state.
Turkey used the estimated 1 million Iraqi Turkmens as a bargaining
chip to stifle Kurdish ambitions.
With the eruption of the latest Iraq crisis, Ankara drew several lines
in the sand: it declared it would not tolerate the seizure of the
northern Iraqi cities of Mosul and Kirkuk by the Iraqi Kurds; that
it would oppose Kurdish control of Iraq’s rich northern oil fields;
that it would oppose Kurdish domination of its Turkmen allies; and,
finally, that it would oppose the founding of any sort of independent
Kurdish entity (including a federal arrangement) in northern Iraq.
When talks about opening a second front against Iraq began between
Ankara and Washington, the Turks introduced more conditions: the US
must not provide the Kurds with heavy weapons, and that the Kurds
are prevented from taking part in fighting against Iraqi forces.
These talks ultimately failed when the Turkish Parliament rejected
a government bill asking it to agree to the deployment of American
forces on Turkish soil in preparation for moving into northern Iraq.
The Turkish refusal was originally the result of American failure
to provide sufficient guarantees about the role the Kurds would play
in a future Iraq.
The Turks were suspicious that the Americans had their own hidden
agenda concerning the future of Iraq that of the north especially
and that they had already promised the Kurds an independent
state of their own.
Ankara realized Washington’s calculations on the Kurdish question
were different to Turkey’s. Ankara has always considered the
issue of northern Iraq from the standpoint of its own 12-million-strong
Turkish Kurd population. Washington, however, looked at the issue
from a different angle that of its effect on the Iraqi situation
and the future of the country after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
Washington saw the Kurds as their most reliable allies in Iraq over
the last several years. They were the only players on the Iraqi stage
who could be used to pressure and threaten others. Washington therefore
wanted to guarantee that the Kurds could take part in future negotiations
from a position of strength. That, consequently, was why the Americans
allowed the peshmergas to capture Mosul and the strategically and
ethnically crucial city of Kirkuk, and to seize control of the whole
of Iraqi Kurdistan. The rich northern Iraqi oil fields are now in
Kurdish hands. The Kurds, moreover, have the only organized military
force in Iraq at the moment, after the collapse of the Iraqi Army.
In all this, Washington has merely been rewarding its faithful Kurdish
allies. The Kurds will become America’s tools for carrying out
US policies in Iraq. That was why the United States maintained intense
pressure on Ankara to dissuade it from intervening militarily in northern
Iraq.
There is no doubt that by allowing the Kurds to transgress Ankara’s
red lines, the Americans were punishing the Turks for letting them
down. But the Iraqi dimension in the American-supported Kurdish action
forced Ankara to lower its expectations. Instead of intervening in
the north, the Turks agreed to a token Kurdish withdrawal from Kirkuk
and Mosul to assuage their public opinion.
The transgression of Ankara’s red lines were not its only failure;
in fact, the entire Turkish policy failed. Turkey was unable to intervene
in northern Iraq. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan lamely declared
that Turkey had no serious worries about the situation in northern
Iraq.
Perhaps Ankara had exaggerated; maybe it should never have set conditions
on a situation taking place in a foreign country. It is entirely possible
that even Ankara’s final red line (that the founding of an independent
Kurdish state would lead to war) would be ignored as well. After all,
Turkey’s Kurdish problem lies not in northern Iraq but inside
its own borders.
The Americans reacted violently to Turkey’s refusal to open a
northern front. New York Times columnist William Safire, who is widely
perceived as speaking for the US administration, threatened Turkey
with dire consequences after the war is over.
Its efforts to open a northern front stymied, the US was forced to
wage war on one front only. But initial failure in the south caused
the Americans to think of reviving the northern front. That was why
Secretary of State Colin Powell traveled to Ankara on April 2. As
a result of Powell’s visit, Turkey was declared part of the “coalition.”
In exchange for extending logistical support to the Americans in northern
Iraq, Washington gave an undertaking that the Kurds would not be allowed
to seize Kirkuk and Mosul.
The two sides had momentarily avoided a clash of interests. Yet it
was as soon as April 9 that Baghdad suddenly fell with the disappearance
of the leaders of the Iraqi regime.
The war between Washington and Saddam Hussein was officially over
but a new one was already beginning. Only hours after Baghdad
fell, Kurdish peshmerga fighters entered Kirkuk. A day later, they
seized Mosul. Ankara was “shocked and awed” at these developments.
Was this the “settling of scores” between Washington and
Ankara predicted by Safire? Have Turkey’s worst fears been realized?
In short, the answer to all these questions is “yes!”
Turkey’s lines in the sand were crossed in hours, and the Kurds
captured Kirkuk and Mosul. The entire area of Iraqi Kurdistan was
in their hands, and so was the fate of the Turkmens. Kirkuk is nearer
than any other time to becoming the next Kurdish capital. Turkey was
unable to carry out its threat of military intervention.
Turkey realized too late that its real battle was not with the Kurds,
but with the Americans.
(Mohammad Noureddine is a Beirut-based analyst on Turkish affairs.
He wrote this commentary for The Daily Star)
3. - BBC - "Turkish Cypriots open borders":
22 APRIL 2003
The authorities in the breakaway Turkish north of Cyprus have announced
that they will open access to the Greek Cypriot part of the island
after nearly 30 years of enforced separation.
Turkish Cypriots will be able to go over the border, which is expected
to be opened on Wednesday, for day-long crossings.
The move coincides with a series of confidence-building measures announced by the Greek-led Cypriot Government after the collapse of peace talks last month.
Until now, the two communities on Cyprus have been separated by a militarised UN buffer zone with virtually no contact between them.
While these steps will clearly go some way to ease the tension and the economic imbalance between the two communities, there are no signs that the key political issues of territory and sovereignty are any closer to being resolved, says the BBC's Tabitha Morgan in Cyprus.
Monday's announcement comes a week after the Greek Cypriots signed the European Union accession treaty paving the way for EU membership next year.
The EU says it will admit only the internationally recognised Greek part of Cyprus if the island is not unified in time for formal membership in May 2004.
'Test'
Serdar Denktash, the deputy Turkish Cypriot prime minister and son of the prime minister, said residents of the north would be permitted to enter the south every day provided they returned by midnight.
Mr Denktash said this would be a test of whether the two sides could live together.
"Whether the Greek Cypriots allow (citizens) to enter the south is something for them to decide," Serdar Denktash said.
"This is a unilateral decision passed to build confidence and promote peace. We hope the Greek Cypriots will follow suit."
Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister George Iacovou also announced a series of proposals designed to allow trade between the two sides and to enable Turkish Cypriots to work in Greek part of the island.
The economy of northern Cyprus is in bad shape compared to that in
the south, and many Turkish Cypriots are unemployed.
4. - The Financial Times - "US warned to keep out of Turkey's EU talks":
April 22, 2003 / by George Parker and Judy Dempsey in Brussels
Turkey's hopes of early entry to the European Union risk being damaged by interference from the US, according to Gunter Verheugen, the EU's enlargement commissioner.
Mr Verheugen says US pressure has been "counter-productive" to the Turkish cause and insists it is better for the EU to conduct negotiations with Ankara in a low-key atmosphere.
With tensions between the US and some European countries still high after the Iraq war, Mr Verheugen urged Washington to stay out of what are likely to be difficult talks with Turkey.
The EU has agreed to assess Turkey's membership credentials by the end of 2004, and Mr Verheugen wants to see solid evidence that Ankara is implementing political and economic reforms.
But he says Washington's push to bring Turkey into the EU at the earliest opportunity annoyed many Europeans at last December's Copenhagen summit, when Ankara's membership bid was discussed.
Political opinion in some EU member states, including Germany, is still divided on the merits of Turkish membership, and some fear that further American lobbying could harden opinion.
"We should never forget that 15 EU leaders have decided that Turkey can be a member," Mr Verheugen said in an interview with the Financial Times. "Everyone understands the US interest and the need for Turkey to be firmly anchored in western democracy. There is no need for them to use such strong pressure."
Military preparations for the Iraq war caused diplomatic problems between the US and Turkey. Although both Washington and Ankara still maintain their alliance is strong, some Bush administration insiders say it is now less likely that the US will plead Turkey's cause.
Some in Ankara have even suggested the Iraq crisis and difficulties with the US have brought Turkey closer to Europe.
Mr Verheugen said he wanted Ankara to continue with its reforms "as soon as possible" and to start showing Brussels that it was serious about seeing them through.
"I believe the process hasn't come to an end - there is still more that needs to be done when it comes to implementation," he said.
Last weekend Costas Simitis, Greek prime minister and occupant of the rotating EU presidency, said Turkey's prospects of opening accession talks would also be helped if it brokered a political settlement on the divided island of Cyprus.
Last week in Athens Mr Verheugen saw the fruition of years of work when 10 nations - mainly from the former communist bloc - signed the accession treaty to expand the EU from 15 to 25 nations. But he hopes progress can be made on adding three more - Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria - before his term of office expires in November 2004.
Romania and Bulgaria are ahead of Turkey and hope to conclude negotiations with the EU before Mr Verheugen steps down.
He said there had been fears that the momentum towards the next phase of enlargement might slow but he remained confident that Romania and Bulgaria were still on track.
"In both countries I see an acceleration of reform," he
said. "They have both started on judicial and administrative
reform."
5. - AFP - "Turkey's FM admits snags in Azeri-Turkish pipeline project":
ANKARA / April 20, 2003
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul admitted Sunday that problems over land expropriation and taxes in Turkey are holding up work on the construction of a major oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey's Mediterranean coast.
In an interview with the CNN-Turk channel, Gul confirmed that British oil multinational BP, the project operator of the planned Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, had complained to the Turkish government over the difficulties.
"We have recently received such a letter. They have raised certain complaints... Some expropriation affairs, some financial affairs and tax issues are creating problems," Gul said, without elaborating.
He pledged that Ankara would clear the snags in the shortest possible time.
"We have taken an extraordinarily speedy action to overcome the problems. This project is very important for us and the prime minister (Recep Tayyip Erdogan)is personally following the matter," Gul said.
His comments came atop an announcement from Baku Saturday that a
hoped-for loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
to finance the Azeri section of the conduit has run into problems,
apparently due to widespread concerns about the
environmental impact of the project.
The announcement was seen as a blow for the 2.9-billion-dollar pipeline project to export Caspian oil to the Mediterranean, which has already been dogged by criticism from environmental groups.
The BTC pipeline, due for completion in 2005, will carry crude from Azerbaijan's sector of the Caspian Sea via Georgia to a tanker terminal at the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
It is backed by the United States and investors include BP, ConocoPhillips,
Statoil, Unocal, Itochu, Inpex, TPAO, Eni Agip, Delta Hess and Azerbaijan's
state oil company SOCAR.
6. - Kathimerini (Greece) - "Turkish FM: No plans for annexation":
Athens / 21 April 2003
In Ankara, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, stressed yesterday that efforts to solve the Cyprus problem would continue. Although the island’s EU accession had complicated things, they said, they hoped a solution could be reached.
Gul said that, unlike previous governments, this one was not threatening to annex the Turkish-occupied north of Cyprus if the island joined the EU, which it is to do on May 1, 2004, following its signing an accession treaty last Wednesday.
“Our wish and our frank efforts are aimed at solving the problem within the year,” Gul told the CNN-Turk television channel. In this way, he said, the Turkish Cypriots could join the EU as the vanguard of Turkey and the Turkish language. “Our difference with former governments is that they said they would annex northern Cyprus if the Greek Cypriots joined the European Union but we will not do the same. We will keep working for a solution up to the last moment,” Gul said. His comments were re-transmitted and translated by Greece’s NET state television.
Previous governments, before Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party won an outright majority in November’s elections, had said they could annex northern Cyprus if the island joined the EU with a settlement.
Erdogan, speaking on Turkey’s private ATV channel, repeated his previous comment that “not solving the problem is not the solution.” Erdogan, however, noted that “in my opinion, a very serious mistake has been made” by the EU in what he termed including Cyprus in the group photo that was taken after Wednesday’s Accession Treaty signing. He stressed that Turkey would stick with the negotiations. “We should never be the side which escapes from negotiations, we should always put forward our attitude that we favor negotiations,” he said, the Anatolia news agency reported.
Gul said the “worst-case scenario” would be the failure
to find a solution at all, thereby postponing Turkish-Cypriot entry
into the EU until Turkey itself becomes a member, the Agence France-Presse
quoted him saying.