9
February 2005
1. "European rights court condemns Turkey for jailing Kurdish writer", the European Court of Human Rights Tuesday censured Turkey for violating the right to free speech of a Kurd, jailed because a book he published was considered separatist Kurdish propaganda.
2. "Majority of Turks favour joining EU", An overwhelming majority of Turks favour their country's admission into the European Union which gave the mainly Muslim nation the green light for membership talks last year, according to a survey made public Wednesday.
3. "Rice Interview With Turkeys Kanal-D TV", interview With Metehan Demir of Turkey's Kanal-D TV.
4. "Business thriving in Iraqi Kurdistan", businessmen are optimistic in the north, according to survey.
5. "Kurds feel political muscle as Iraqi results take shape", with a No. 2 showing in early returns, they say they will push for the presidency. They could be the power brokers.
6. "Turkish-Russian Relations: Implications for Eurasia's Geopolitics", as a result of its geography, Turkey maintains a multi-dimensional and dynamic foreign policy.
1. - AFP - "European rights court condemns Turkey for jailing
Kurdish writer":
STRASBOURG / 8 February 2005
The European Court of Human Rights Tuesday censured Turkey for violating the right to free speech of a Kurd, jailed because a book he published was considered separatist Kurdish propaganda.
"The tenor of the book was not such as to justify the applicants criminal conviction," the court ruled, according to a press release.
Muzaffer Erdost, now 73, a Turkish national belonging to the Kurdish minority, was jailed for a year in 1997 for his book published a year earlier and relating how extrajudicial persecution had led to bloodshed in the Kurdish town of Sivas in 1978, 1993 and 1996.
A public prosecutor had applied to the Ankara State Security Court for an order for the book, called "Three Sivases, in the centre of the pressure being exerted for the imposition of a new [Treaty of] Sevres on Turkey," to be seized, saying it contained separatist propaganda representing a threat to Turkish state integrity.
The largely Kurdish area of southeastern Turkey has been seeking autonomy, leading to large-scale repression by Turkish authorities of Kurdish militants.
Under the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, part of the post-World War I settlement, the victorious allies promised autonomy for the Kurds of southeastern Turkey.
The court ruled that the jail sentence and the book’s confiscation "did not meet a pressing social need and was accordingly not necessary in a democratic society."
It said there had been a violation of Article 10 of the European Human Rights Convention covering freedom of expression.
It acknowledged that passages from the book contained references to people from different ethnic origins and to the founding of a Kurdish state on the collapse of the Republic of Turkey.
"However, those references were quotations from articles in the press which could not of themselves justify the interference with the applicants right to freedom of expression," it found.
The court also ruled that the plaintiff had been denied the right to a fair hearing "on account of the State Security Courts lack of independence and impartiality."
It awarded him 7,500 euros (9,600 dollars) damages plus costs.
Turkey’s southeast suffered years of violence with some 37,000 deaths during a government military campaign against rebels of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
Thousands of mainly Kurdish dissidents were believed to have been killed extrajudicially.
The PKK, now called KONGRA-GEL, called off a unilateral ceasefire with Ankara last June and sporadic fighting has resumed.
Turkey is keen to join the European Union, but has come under EU criticism for its perceived human rights record.
The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the
Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations
of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. 
2. - AFP - "Majority of Turks favour joining EU":
ANKARA / 9 February 2005
An overwhelming majority of Turks favour their country's admission into the European Union which gave the mainly Muslim nation the green light for membership talks last year, according to a survey made public Wednesday.
The poll, conducted by the state statistics institute among 6,174 people last November and carried by the Anatolia news agency, found that 70.2 percent of the interviewees would vote in favour of Turkey joining the pan-European bloc if a referendum were held on the subject.
A total of 16.2 percent said they would vote against it while 13.6 were undecided.
The poll revealed a disparity between sexes on the subject. A total of 77.5 percent of men said they were for entering the EU while only 63.1 percent of women were in favour, the poll said.
At an historic summit on December 16-17, EU leaders agreed to opening
accession talks with Turkey on October 3, but attached a series of
tough conditions.
3. - US State Department - "Rice Interview With Turkeys Kanal-D TV":
Interview With Metehan Demir of Turkey's Kanal-D TV
Secretary Condoleezza Rice
Ankara, Turkey
February 6, 2005
QUESTION: Welcome to Turkey again.
SECRETARY RICE: Thank you.
QUESTION: What do you think about the recent Kurdish statements about breaking away from Iraq as an independent state? Can you declare clearly that the US will not tolerate any division of Iraq and will not allow any unilateral changes by the Kurds in the status of Kirkuk? And do you believe that Turkey might intervene in Kirkuk if such a decision is taken by the Kurds?
SECRETARY RICE: The United States has been absolutely clear that we are committed to a united Iraq. That we are committed to an Iraq in which all parties and all groups - whether Turkmen or Kurds or Shiites or Sunnis - are all welcome, And other minorities too, all welcomed, all represented, all respected within a unified Iraq. The United States believes strongly in the territorial integrity of Iraq, and we'll work with the parties to make certain that is the outcome.
We also believe that Kirkuk needs to be a city in which all Iraqis are welcome. And we know its history. We know that Saddam Hussein, through his dictatorship and his methods, contributed to tensions about Kirkuk. But it is a city that really must represent all Iraqis.
QUESTION: It shouldn't have a special status?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, it's going to be up to the Iraqis to decide
in their democratic state how Kirkuk is administered. But it really
must be a place where all Iraqis are welcome and respected.
QUESTION: Turkey has been very critical of Washington that the US
is not keeping its earlier promises in fighting the PKK, which is
already officially declared as terrorist by Washington. Do you plan
to take a concrete step against the PKK presence in northern Iraq
or is there any policy change by the US on the issue?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, the very fact that the PKK is declared as a terrorist organization in the United States means that there are certain things that the United States is obligated to do. For instance, we are obligated to do what we can to deal with their financing so that they don't receive moneys in any way that the United States can stop it from happening.
We of course understand and are thoroughly committed to the fact that terrorism should not come from the territory of northern Iraq. And we are in a trilateral arrangement, mechanism, with the Iraqis and with Turkey to deal with the threat of the PKK. We will do everything that we can. The security situation is difficult still in the country, and there are at this point some limits on what we can do. But it is not because of a lack of commitment to dealing with the PKK, and we will do so because they are a terrorist organization and ought to be dealt with as a terrorist organization.
QUESTION: Iran seems to be the number one issue on President's Bush agenda in his second term especially. How do you see neighboring Turkey's role in connection with developments in Iran?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, Iran will be one of many issues for the President's agenda and since the President's agenda deals with a broader Middle East and reform in the Middle East, part of the problem is that Iran is out of step with that effort at reform in the Middle East.
Turkey, on the other hand, is one of America's strongest partners in the broader Middle East reform, a functioning democracy, Islamic people here who are faithful and devout, but devoted to democracy. That is the hope for the Middle East more broadly. So Turkey has a very important role to play in helping to create, helping to support those in the Middle East who want a different kind of Middle East. In terms of Iran, we all have to be very firm with Iran that its support for terrorism is unacceptable, that its efforts to build a nuclear weapon under cover of civilian nuclear power is unacceptable. I think Turkey will be a strong ally in that.
QUESTION: In an interview with Larry King, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld said recently that Turkey's decision last year that did not allow the transfer of American Fourth Infantry Division from Turkey to Iraq was one source of problems today because, he said, he says, exceptional number of Sunnis were captured or killed. That's why he says this is still fomenting the insurgency in Iraq. Does the U.S. still have the negative impacts of last year's Turkey's decision?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, it was certainly a disappointing decision given our long alliance and the need to transport American forces, and I think we made no secret of that. I think whatever the relationship was to what happened subsequently is really speculative but we are moving on in our relationship. If we were not moving on, it would not be the case that the United States has been so strongly supportive of Turkish accession to the European Union or the support for the Turkish economic reforms and its IMF program. We are moving on. We've got a lot of work to do together and that's what I am here to talk about.
QUESTION: Maybe this could be a follow-up question. Both Turkey and the US describe the relationship as a strategic partnership. What Dr. Rice in your view makes this a strategic partnership?
SECRETARY RICE: What makes it a strategic partnership, first of all, is a long history of having a relationship that is devoted to a more secure, stable balance in the world. Turkey was an important fighter, an important ally in the Cold War as we overcame the division of Europe and brought down imperial communism. Turkey is of course a member of NATO, the most important and most successful strategic alliance. And it was NATO's job in the past to prevent the spread of Soviet power, to give cover to democratization in Europe. NATO is now involved in trying to spread stability and democracy to others parts of the world. So Turkey has been in control of the ISAF in Afghanistan, for instance, turning Afghanistan - a place that was the primary territorial source of Al-Qaeda terrorism - into a state that will be peaceful and fighting terror. That's really what it means to be a strategic ally. It means cooperating around the world to make the world more stable, to fight terrorism, and indeed to spread liberty and democracy.
QUESTION: How do you see Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's critical remarks on the United States regarding the ongoing operations in Iraq?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, we've had a discussion of Iraq, and I think that the Iraqi people and their election last Sunday gives us an opportunity now to look ahead to how we are all going to support a democratic Iraq, an Iraq that is unified and an Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors.
And for all of us, we need to say to our publics, as I'm having an opportunity, thanks to you, to say today, this is a fundamentally strong and important relationship. It is critical to the security and the future of both the United States and Turkey. We have to speak up for the importance of this relationship. Friends will sometimes disagree, but when we disagree, we have to do so from a basis that still understands the vital importance of this relationship, that it allows us to do things like support each other in places like Afghanistan, to support Turkish accession to the European Union, to support Turkish economic reform through the IMF. That's what friends do. And so even when we have our disagreements, we need to be very clear that this relationship is very much worth it.
QUESTION: Does the Pentagon foresee, or does the United States administration foresee, more of a role for Incirlik airbase, because there has been a lot of speculation. Maybe from your position it would be very useful to clarify what is the US idea on Incirlik airbase?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, first of all since Incirlik is a Turkish airbase, anything that we do we would, of course, have to do with Turkey. We will have discussions, broad discussions about how the changed circumstances change our needs. But some of the things that I have seen about major basing of American aircraft and so forth, I think that is really not on the table.
QUESTION: Do you think that further steps should be taken to reward the Turks in Cyprus who said to yes last year to the referendum in the name of a solution on the island while the Greek Cypriots said no to this referendum. Many promised, many heavyweights in the world promised -- including the US and the EU -- to take better steps to make Turks' position better, but nothing is specifically done so far. Do you have more plans for the Turkish Cypriots?
SECRETARY RICE: Well, we are looking at what we can do to ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots because we, like everyone else, were disappointed that the Annan plan was not adopted. We have taken some steps, direct aid for instance to the Turkish Cypriots, but there are probably other things that we should look at doing. We should get back to trying to find a way to unify the island.
QUESTION: One short question and the last one. What should be done for solving the dispute between Turkey and Armenia? Does the U.S. plan any special initiative this year to solve this problem?
SECRETARY STATE: Well, we would certainly hope that Turkey and Armenia would find a way to bridge the differences. We know the very difficult history here. And we recognize the difficult history. But we are a long time now into the future. And on the basis of democratic development and the economic development and the need for stability, we would hope and encourage the parties to find ways to bridge their differences.
QUESTION: How long will it take for Turkey to become a full member of the European Union? In your opinion.
SECRETARY RICE: Well, unfortunately we are not members of the European Union So we can't say. We've been supporters of Turkey's accession and of that happening as quickly as possible. Obviously, there are standards that Turkey needs to meet. And the European Union is well within its rights to say that there are certain things that need to be done in order to bring about Turkey's accession. But I think we've been a supportive as anyone for that accession to take place. And given that we are not a member, it really is up to Turkey and the European Union to find a way for it -- with Turkey doing what it needs to do and with Europe being welcoming of a Turkey that really does have a rightful place in the world.
QUESTION: Secretary Rice, thank you very much for being with us. It was a nice opportunity. Many thanks and enjoy your trip.
4. - Irin News - "Business thriving in Iraqi Kurdistan":
Businessmen are optimistic in the north, according to survey.
SULAYMANIYAH / 8 February 2005 / by Mike White
A survey of 454 Iraqi businessmen has shown high levels of optimism about the Iraq’s economic prospects.
The survey was carried out by US based pollster Zogby International on behalf of the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE).
Interviews were carried out in the cities of Baghdad, mainly Shi’ite Hilla and mainly Kurdish Arbil between 17 October and 2 December 2004. The interviewees are all owners of small to medium-sized companies and 69 percent confidence in a brighter future for their businesses.
"What we’re seeing is the rebirth of an Iraqi business community that is seeing opportunity," said CIPE president John Sullivan.
In Sulaymaniyah, an increasingly prosperous city in Iraq’s Kurdish northeast, you don’t have to look far to find the reasons for such confidence.
"You see this can of coke," said supermarket owner Jamal Mohamed Rahim. "Two years ago, you would have had to pay seven Iraqi dinars [approx US $1.00] for it to be brought from Turkey. Now, we buy from Dubai, for less than a third of that."
Like the rest of Iraq, the Kurdish-controlled north was debilitated by sanctions between 1991 and 2003. And it wasn’t just the international community blocking commerce with the outside world. The regime in Baghdad also did its best to undermine efforts by the autonomous Kurdish authorities to develop economically.
The few international goods on the market in the north were smuggled in from Turkey, Iran or Syria, mainly by a small clique of wealthy businessmen with close links to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These two parties still divide the north between them.
"Before the war, importers had to pay tariffs to the KDP and the PUK, as well as at the border," Rahim told IRIN. "Now there is a five dollar charge per truck coming into Iraq. That’s all."
The resulting decrease in price has been accompanied by a rise in wages in some sectors. Before the war, low-ranking civil servants would have been content to earn the equivalent of $20. Now, they complain at anything lower than $300, observers say.
The result, according to carpet importer Ahmed Haji Rasul, has been a radical change in consumer taste.
"In the past, people made do with what they could afford," he told IRIN in the Sulaymaniyah bazaar. "Now they want colour-coordinated house interiors, European stuff. We’ve had to start importing from further afield."
Consumer tastes have also been sharpened by new regulations permitting civil servants, whose have fixed salaries, to pay in installments. Turkish washing machines and sofas were once way out of peoples’ financial reach. Now, according to the local agents for the Turkish companies Beko and Istikbal, they’re all the rage.
For Omar Haji Mahmud, who imports rice and sugar from as far afield as Pakistan and India, the greatest boost to business over the past two years have been improvements in communication.
"Under sanctions, I couldn’t even contact my family in Halabja, 70 km away," he joked. "Now, I can pick up my mobile and talk to Sri Lanka, if I want."
Mahmud acknowledged that political connections still play an important role in business, quoting a recent local government decision to hand all cement imports to Iran to one company. Like other businessmen interviewed though, he was confident that the day of the monopoly is coming to an end.
"A whole new generation of businessmen has sprung up since the war," he said, "with new ideas, new energy and international connections."
But not everybody shares the optimism. Faced with the sight of hundreds of tonnes of cheap Turkish potatoes being trucked across the border every day, many local farmers are understandably concerned their livelihoods are at risk.
Others point out that the boom in consumer spending has had not stimulated local industrial development. Cynics note that, with the exception of oil, the only thing Iraq exports is a vinegar-based salad sauce.
"We’re in danger of being swamped," said a concerned
Mohamed Sadik Barzani, owner of a carpet factory in Barzan, a town
three hours north of Arbil.
5. - The New York Times - "Kurds feel political muscle as Iraqi results take shape":
With a No. 2 showing in early returns, they say they will push for the presidency. They could be the power brokers.
BAGHDAD / 9 February 2005 / by Edward Wong
Early election returns indicating that the Kurds could be the power brokers in forming a new government have emboldened their leaders to press an agenda that could define the political battlegrounds in the new Iraq.
If current election returns hold, the relatively secular Kurds would be in a position to limit any attempts by religious Shiites to install an Islamic government.
Kurdish leaders said yesterday that they were pushing for a Kurd to be president. They also were seeking guarantees that they could maintain an autonomous region in the north, which could heighten tensions with neighboring countries that are suspicious of any moves toward Kurdish independence.
U.S. officials have long considered the Kurds to be their closest allies in Iraq, partly because they are generally less religiously observant than Arabs here. As the country moves toward a new government and constitution, the Americans could find themselves depending on the Kurds to act as a check on conservative Islamic politicians.
The Kurds' confidence in their political muscle has grown since Monday, when it became apparent they were likely to have the second-largest bloc in the new National Assembly. Because forming a government will require a two-thirds vote in the assembly, and because it seems unlikely the main Shiite slate will get such a majority, the Kurds may prove to be an essential coalition partner.
The electoral commission announced Monday that the main Kurdish coalition had 25 percent of the votes tallied so far, behind the leading Shiite ticket - the United Iraqi Alliance - but well ahead of other parties.
About 4.6 million of an estimated eight million votes have been counted. The probable ethnic and sectarian breakdown of the voters to be counted means the Kurds will likely get at least one-fifth of the 275 assembly seats.
One possibility is that the Shiite alliance, which has a strong Islamic component, could join the Kurds to form a government. Other groups, such as the secular Shiite slate led by interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, which by Monday had captured 13 percent of the vote, could court the Kurds to form a bloc with enough veto power to head off the main Shiites.
That leaves the Kurds in a position to make political demands.
"It's truly a different ball game, and it's new to this part of the world," said Barham Salih, the deputy prime minister and a top Kurdish official. "There will be a lot of bargaining, a lot of back and forth, a lot of compromises."
The new Iraqi president and two vice presidents are to be elected from the ranks of the National Assembly. The three will then appoint the prime minister and the cabinet.
Securing the post of president would give the Kurds enormous power in the appointments and would bolster their standing in the Middle East, where the governments of neighboring Turkey, Syria and Iran are fearful of any moves toward independence by Kurds in their own countries.
The Kurds have governed northern Iraq since the end of the first Persian Gulf War in 1991, when the Americans established a no-flight zone to protect the north from incursions by Saddam Hussein's military.
The ambitions of the Kurds will likely be opposed by politicians seeking to install a Sunni Arab as president in order to draw the Sunnis, who once dominated Iraq, into the political process, despite their boycott of the Jan. 30 election.
As the political jockeying intensified yesterday, violence continued.
A suicide bomber detonated his explosives outside a recruiting station
for national guardsmen in Baghdad, killing at least 21 people and
wounding at least 27, according to U.S. military and Iraqi officials.
All those killed were men signing up for the national guard, a Defense
Ministry official said. Insurgents have killed at least 70 people
in attacks on Iraqi security forces since Sunday.
6. - PNIR - "Turkish-Russian Relations: Implications for Eurasia's Geopolitics":
9 February 2005
As a result of its geography, Turkey maintains a multi-dimensional and dynamic foreign policy. Turkish foreign policymakers are carefully analyzing their foreign policy options in light of the 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq. Within this set of complex links, Turkish-Russian relations appear rather perplexing. Historically, there have been many wars between these two states up until the end of WWI. Both countries have imperial legacies and have experienced a post-imperial traumatic loneliness. Great imperial legacies and the feelings of isolation after the collapse of the previous empires are important factors that shape the national memory of these countries.
After Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Turkey in December of last year, Turkey's prime minister paid a one day official visit to Russia on January 10, 2005. It is relevant to analyze current factors that determine the relations between these two states. Domestic politics in Russia is often the result of competing views of Westerners, anti-Westerners, Eurasianists, ultra-nationalists and nostalgic communists. Russian foreign policy is generally determined along the line of domestic political preferences. There is a symbolic pendulum in Russian foreign policy that vacillates between Europe and Asia depending on the political balances currently at play. Russian foreign policy is today more critical of the West and follows a more Eurasian-oriented path.
For Moscow, the existence of such national memory and geopolitical orientation makes it difficult to determine a fixed and well-functioning foreign policy towards Turkey. Like Russia, Turkey has Caucasian, Balkan, Middle Eastern and European identities and different interests at stake in all of these regions. Another significant factor is that both countries are going through dynamic domestic and economic transformations. The change in the early four years of the current decade is surely dramatic at both societal and state levels.
Issues at Stake
More specifically, the future of Turkish-Russian relations will be a product of bilateral, regional and international developments. High-level mutual visits in the recent period underline a number of important issues between the two states. Although observers seem to have an optimistic perception of the relations both in Moscow and Ankara, there are issues of contention between the two states.
The issues of bilateral relations will be trade, investments by Turkish and Russian businessmen, tourism, natural gas purchases, Russian oil tankers transiting the straits, future pipeline projects that may pass through the Trace or Anatolia, the Chechen question, Russian arms sales, and the actions of Kurdish separatists on Russian soil. A major recent development is the Russian leader's statement that the Turkish society in Northern Cyprus deserves better treatment from the international community, since the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the U.N. plan designed to put an end to the division of the island.
Although there is much talk about the convergence of interests between Turkey and Russia, one should also point out the conflicting ones. Both countries favor improving their current relations and adopting a more pragmatic stance on the international arena. Officials on both sides signed a number of agreements, which will surely facilitate the establishment of constructive relations.
The volume of bilateral trade reached $10 billion in 2004, and both sides aim to increase this volume to $25 billion by 2007. Turkey's construction sector is active in Moscow and is increasing its market share in Russia. Russian businessmen closely follow Turkey's privatization process and want to take part in energy projects in Turkey. Another major cooperation area is Russian arms sales to Turkey. Considering the Iraq crisis and potential instability in Iran and Syria, Ankara pays serious attention to military modernization projects and has an interest in Russian arms supplies. Finally, Russian tourists increasingly prefer Turkey's Mediterranean coast for their vacations.
At another level, the mutual agenda is set around Russia's energy geopolitics, its near abroad policies, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (B.T.C.) oil pipeline, ethnic secessionist movements in the Caucasus, the reduction of Russian military forces in the region in accordance with international agreements, and the problems emerging after the Iraq war. Russia dislikes the B.T.C. pipeline, which is expected to transit Azeri and Kazak oil to the West. Moscow regards this pipeline as a challenge to its status in the Caspian basin and an obstacle to its oil trade. Although the major conflict surrounding the B.T.C. pipeline was between Russia and a number of former Soviet states, it indirectly influenced Turkish-Russian relations. However, the Blue Stream project -- a natural gas pipeline that runs from Russia to Turkey via the Black Sea -- and several other Turkish-Russian oil pipeline projects have led to the emergence of a "low profile" policy concerning oil politics on the part of Russia. Although it is speculative at the moment, the head of British Petroleum Company in Azerbaijan recently floated the possibility of carrying Russian oil through the B.T.C.
According to the official Turkish policy line, the Chechen question is a Russian internal problem. Turkish officials frequently declare that Russian security measures should not violate human rights in Chechnya. However, a large Chechen diaspora in Turkey follows a different line and tries its best to assist Chechen guerrillas, creating significant tensions between the Turkish and Russian governments. In return, Turkish officials have expressed discontent about the Kurdistan Workers Party's -- a rebel Kurdish armed movement -- activities in Russian territories. For the time being, both sides extend considerable vigor in order not to sever their relations on account of trans-boundary ethnic problems.
Toward a New Geopolitics
Russia has a regional profile and is sensitive about losing its influence in ex-Soviet territories. Since 1991, Turkey has emerged as a significant regional player, pursuing a special relationship with the E.U. and paying serious attention to building good relations in the Caucasus and Central Asia. How closer Turkish-Russian relations will be interpreted in Brussels and Washington is another important question.
The U.S. military deployment in different parts of Eurasia, the pro-Western change in domestic landscapes of Georgia and Ukraine, the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are, among others, the developments that have paved the way for the emergence of a new geopolitics in Eurasia. The European and U.S. expansion into former Soviet territories influences Russian policymakers to seek new alliances in Asia. Russian rapprochement with Iran, China and India are examples of this new policy. In this sense, the new developments in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks are bringing together the policies of not only Russia and other major Asian powers, but also some critical European states like France and Germany.
After receiving a negotiation date for E.U. membership, Turkey is emerging as a European actor in the region. However, Turkey's new orientation was tested during the subsequent domestic transformations of Georgia and Ukraine. Turkey adopted a low profile attitude toward the Russian policies vis-à-vis Ukraine and Georgia, and sensitively displayed a constructive outlook by pointing to the relevant international norms and agreements as the way to resolve the crises. Ankara tries to avoid taking sides in any "Russia versus the West" struggles, while developing its own relations with Moscow.
One other important area of contention is Turkish-Armenian relations, which are held hostage to historical enmities and Turkey's pro-Azerbaijan policies in the Caucasus. Currently, Russia is the main ally of Armenia, and possible Russian mediation between Turkey and Armenia on a number of issues can be expected. Following recent positive developments on this front, there may be Russian-Turkish joint attempts to solve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
Conclusion
By looking at the current developments, it can be concluded that Turkish-Russian relations will improve in the political, economic and security realms. However, the relations are not free from a number of serious problems that could threaten to derail these growing ties; both countries have converging and conflicting interests in neighboring regions, and this status makes Turkish-Russian relations promising yet difficult. Turkey and Russia are two influential actors in the Eurasian geopolitics and their relations have implications for the whole Eurasian region. Because of this, internal and external players in Eurasian geopolitical gambling will keep an eye on this growing relationship.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Bulent Aras
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