8
February 2006
1. "Turkish Prosecutor denies Öcalan suffered heart spasm in prison", a Turkish prosecutor denied on Tuesday that imprisoned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan had suffered a heart spasm overnight.
2. "Turkey’s “Deep State” Surfaces in Former President’s Words, Deeds in Kurdish Town", when a former president and seven-time prime minister of Turkey says that the country has not one state but two, many naturally sit up and take notice. When he says this a few days after nationwide riots, sparked by an alleged plot by one of those states to murder a long list of its opponents, it becomes clear that in Turkey, the nature of the state is no abstract political discussion.
3. "‘Feudal’ clash on 'honor killings'", the Turkish parliamenty commission for the investigation of ‘honor killings’ calls for affirmative action favoring women, the education of men, the establishment of committees to prevent honor killings and the introduction of articles into the Constitution that will prevent gender discrimination.
4. "Turkish free speech under microscope again", a Turkish court on Tuesday (7 February) began hearing five prominent journalists accused of insulting the country’s courts, in a case closely watched by Brussels.
5. "Response In Kurdish, For The Punishment To Kurdish Language", Ayse Gokkan, who is the member of IHD (Human Rights Association in Turkey) Branch from Urfa and a writer in the Azadiya Welat magazine, made a response to her punishment, which was given to her because of talking in Kurdish in the congress of HADEP and DEHAP, with explaining this in Kurdish.
6. "Ethnic tensions rising in Kirkuk", the province of Kirkuk - home to about a million Kurds, Turkoman, Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans and Armenians - is a powder keg waiting to explode.
1. - Turkish Daily News - "Prosecutor denies Öcalan suffered heart spasm in prison":
ANKARA / 8 February 2006
A Turkish prosecutor denied on Tuesday that imprisoned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan had suffered a heart spasm overnight.
A Turkish official had said earlier that the 57-year-old Öcalan experienced a mild heart problem related to his being overweight but that he was in a stable condition. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he is not authorized to speak to the media.
But the prosecutor's office that oversees the prison island of Imrali, where Öcalan is the sole inmate, denied that the PKK leader had a heart problem.
"He underwent his routine medical check this morning; there is nothing negative in his health," Deputy Prosecutor Vural Ekiz told The Associated Press by telephone. "The reported incident is not true."
Öcalan's lawyer, Bekir Kaya, said he was also told by Ekiz that Öcalan was fine and had suffered no heart spasm.
Öcalan has been in solitary confinement on the prison island of Imrali, near Istanbul, since his capture in 1999. The PKK has been fighting for autonomy in the Southeast since 1984, with the conflict claiming about 37,000 lives.
His movement and sympathizers have long expressed concern
about Ocalan's health and demanded that he must be moved out of solitary
confinement. 
2. - MRMEA - "Turkey’s “Deep State”
Surfaces in Former President’s Words, Deeds in Kurdish Town":
7 February 2006 / by Jon Gorvett*
When a former president and seven-time prime minister of Turkey says that the country has not one state but two, many naturally sit up and take notice.
When he says this a few days after nationwide riots, sparked by an alleged plot by one of those states to murder a long list of its opponents, it becomes clear that in Turkey, the nature of the state is no abstract political discussion.
Indeed, with two dead and the rioting spreading from the Iranian border to districts of Istanbul, the remarks by Suleyman Demirel made in a mid-November interview with NTV television had a certain urgency to them as well.
“It is fundamental principle that there is one state,” Demirel noted—but added, however, “In our country there are two.”
Demirel, who was president of Turkey from 1994 to 1999, led a string of governments in the 1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s, including one brought to an abrupt end in 1980 by a military coup.
“There is one deep state and one other state,” he elaborated. “The state that should be real is the spare one, the one that should be spare is the real one.”
On Nov. 9, in the southeastern town of Semdinli, few would have disagreed with Demirel’s assessment.
Around lunchtime, eyewitnesses claim, a white “Dogan” car, registered in the central Anatolian city of Konya, drew up near the Umit, or “Hope,” bookstore.
The store was run by Seferi Yilmaz, who is widely thought to have been a sympathizer of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), the ethnic Kurdish guerrilla organization that has been fighting Turkish troops for some 20 years now in order to realize its aim of Kurdish independence. There is no doubt that Yilmaz had served 15 years in prison for alleged PKK membership.
Reportedly, what happened next was that one of the car’s occupants threw a bomb into the bookstore, located in a busy shopping area. The device exploded, killing Yilmaz and seriously wounding another man. The bomber then took flight and headed back for the car. However, the crowd pursued the suspect and surrounded the vehicle. A tussle then ensued, and the occupants of the car reportedly opened fire, killing another man and wounding four others seriously.
The police then arrived, and arrested the car’s four occupants, taking them away to a nearby police station. But by this time members of the crowd had broken into the vehicle, allegedly discovering several AK-47 rifles and a Turkish Gendarmerie Intelligence (JITEM) ID-card in the trunk. There was also reportedly a “hit list” of other targets.
“The state that should be real is the spare one,
the one that should be spare is the real one.”
Reportedly, many in the crowd also recognized the car’s other occupants
as plainclothes JITEM officers—claims later borne out as the police
prepared to prosecute the four men they had arrested. Three were JITEM
NCOs, while the person who allegedly carried out the bombing was a PKK
“confessor.”
Kurdish groups and human rights organizations have in the past often described how such “confessors”—captured PKK members—sometimes are given the chance to go free or take a lesser punishment in return for betraying other PKK members, or even for carrying out attacks against them.
The discovery that the bombing had apparently been an operation of JITEM—one of the most notorious of the undercover security services operating in Turkey—sparked fury among the local, mainly ethnic Kurdish population. Rioting ensued for several days, and spread to other Kurdish communities across the country.
The story also broke in the Turkish press, with allegations that the attack revealed yet again the existence of the “deep state.” It was this dark force to which Demirel subsequently referred.
Defining the “deep state” is not so easy, however. Some argue that it is a hangover from the Cold War, when Western powers sought to establish a network of armed groups that would stay behind in countries that might have fallen to the Soviet bloc. While these groups were then abolished in most countries when the Soviet Union collapsed, the theory is that in Turkey this never happened. Instead, the group continues to operate, an unofficial underground army tied to organized crime and a bevy of corrupt politicians, police and bureaucrats.
Politics Abhors a Vacuum
A wider view of the “deep state,” however, and one that is not uncommon, sees it as a product of Turkey’s weak central state.
Perhaps one way of demonstrating this is to look at the state’s response to the Semdinli incident. The government in Ankara, with the support of the opposition, quickly pushed a bill through parliament setting up an official enquiry. The prime minister himself, Recip Tayyip Erdogan, made a surprise visit to the town and swore that the perpetrators of the bombing would be punished, while also calling for calm and an end to the rioting.
However, some also remembered that Erdogan had visited the southeast’s regional capital, Diyarbakir, back in September and caused great hope of some progress in addressing the region’s considerable problems. Recognizing the existence of the Kurdish issue for the first time, he received strong praise from local Kurdish leaders for doing so.
Since then, however, little if anything has happened. Indeed, many commentators remarked in Semdinli that the prime ministerial delegation looked particularly lost during their visit, perhaps overwhelmed by the strangeness of the situation in which they found themselves, as people in the crowds that had come to see them began to chant complaints and even abuse.
Returning to Ankara from Semdinli, the government came in for further attack—this time from the Turkish military.
A Nov. 24 meeting at the prime ministry with military officials, called to discuss “terrorism,” ended with politicians retreating from their earlier enthusiasm for a full investigation in Semdinli. The military also criticized the politicians for linking the incident to the “deep state,” stressing instead that the PKK—and Kurdish groups across the border in northern Iraq—should have been held responsible.
In the southeast, many will interpret this as another indication of Ankara’s weak political ability to really affect what is going on in the region. The real powers, many ethnic Kurds say, are the military, the police, the gendarmerie and JITEM, along with an array of tribal armies, village guards, other intelligence services and secretive death squads. The “deep state” is all these people, many in Diyarbakir would argue, rather than some Cold War-era hangover. This interwoven pattern of interests will also resist attempts to democratize the southeast—or, for that matter, Turkey in general—as any such attempt would immediately undermine its power.
Dealing with this second state will therefore likely be the biggest challenge facing the government in the years ahead, as its efforts to match European Union standards in particular oblige it to try and unify the mechanisms of power, bringing them under electoral control.
Semdinli may therefore just be the start of a very long—and bumpy—road.
* Jon Gorvett is a free-lance journalist based in Istanbul
(Source: The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs
(MRMEA)
3. - Turkish Daily News - "‘Feudal’ clash on 'honor killings'":
The parliamenty commission for the investigation of ‘honor killings’ calls for affirmative action favoring women, the education of men, the establishment of committees to prevent honor killings and the introduction of articles into the Constitution that will prevent gender discrimination
ANKARA / 8 February 2006 / Göksel Bozkurt
As a parliamentary investigation into “honor killings” and the mistreatment of women and children reaches its final stages, the members of the commission are divided over what to include in their report.
Opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) deputies in the commission wanted to add the statement, “Honor killings are a result of the feudal structure,” to the report, but the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) deputies objected. It was also noted that the commission allocated only a small portion of the report to “honor killings.” Still, it agreed to take serious steps to stop the mistreatment of women and children and call for the establishment of provincial committees that would include the local mayor, mufti and representatives of civil organizations for the fight against the murder of women for “honor.”
The commission was formed after several women and girls were killed or injured by their close relatives in the name of honor, which could even mean the girl was talking to a man on the street. Honor killings are usually seen among families living in rural Anatolia, mostly in the east, or those who have only recently moved to urban centers.
The commission met early this week to assess their draft report. CHP deputy Canan Aritman, who said “honor killings” were due to the feudal structure, argued: “We talked with many people from the region. Each one of them noted the influence feudal relations have on honor killings. There are also studies that point to the same conclusion. I want this noted in the commission report.” Some AKP deputies disputed the cause-and-effect relation stated by Aritman, objecting to the statement being noted in the report. Aritman insisted, resulting in the commission's postponement of the decision until Friday. If there are no final amendments, feudal structure will not be noted as one of the reasons behind the murders.
The report:
The draft version of the report lists the following recommendations to prevent honor killings and the mistreatment of women and children:
* Precautions that taken to prevent the abuse of women should be based on a national plan. The details of the plan need to be clear, with a view to the gender perception of the entire nation. The plan must address the basic reasons why women and children are mistreated, and all legal, educational and cultural measures to be taken need to be initiated at the same time.
* A national 2006-2010 prevention of violence against women and children plan should be prepared and initiated with the participation of volunteers and civil and public institutions.
* The state must condemn every type of violence against women and children in very clear terms and establish this as state policy. Parliament should establish a Gender Equality Commission.
* Women and children in need should be accorded all available protection, with regular checks on women's shelters to ensure they conform to requirements. These shelters must be accessible, and all should respect the principle of secrecy.
* Those guilty of violence and especially incest should be legally forced to undergo rehabilitation. Those guilty of violence should be forced to do community service. The necessary legal changes need to be made.
* In urban planning, streets and parks should be properly lit, with more telephone booths installed. Public places need to be rearranged to be more sensitive to women's needs. This is true for general security as well. Social centers must be established for children and legal amendments should be based on the Convention on Children's Rights.
Educating men:
The report said educational programs aimed at changing the mindset of men concerning violence against women should be initiated and made the following recommendations:
* Legal procedures need to be simplified in favor of the victim.
* The media should educate the public on the causes and the effects of violence against women and children. Media organizations that portray violence as a positive thing in their broadcasts should be warned, and precautions need to be taken. The visual media needs to concentrate on educating women on health issues and literacy, and the programs need to be broadcast at appropriate hours.
Violence hotline:
The commission called for the establishment of a 24-hour, nationally available hotline that could be reached by victims of violence.
The commission called for:
* The establishment of a new procedural system for the interrogation of juveniles.
* The acceleration of medical check-ups for children who are victims of sexual abuse.
* Women and children who are victims of abuse need to be given priority in social assistance.
* A national database on violent incidents needs to be established. The available dates of incidents on child and women victims are deficient and the relevant ministries need to lead the initiative.
* Turkey must sign the European Union's DAPHNE 11 project, which aims to eradicate violence against women as soon as possible.
* Health sector workers need to be briefed on violence against women and children during and after their training.
Sermons need to be utilized:
The commission said sermons prepared by the Religious Affairs Directorate could be used to reach more people:
* The sermons need to concentrate on violence against women and children, family abuse, honor killings and gender discrimination.
* Programs on anger management and communication strategies should be initiated.
* Education programs addressing traditions and beliefs that hinder efforts against violence must be launched, with national campaigns to eradicate harmful practices.
* Women's employment and entrepreneurship needs to be encouraged, with the necessary loans made available.
* The education of girls is of paramount importance.
Honor Killings Prevention Committee:
Families should be educated on honor killings, said the commission, arguing that a national campaign could achieve the desired result of eradicating this crime.
* Provincial committees to eliminate honor killings need to be established with the participation of governor's offices, police departments, municipalities, the gendarmerie, muftis' offices, universities, nongovernmental organizations and community leaders.
* First Step Houses need to be established to provide the necessary assistance to victimized women who leave their shelters.
* A legal amendment to the Criminal Procedures Law must be enacted so that nongovernmental organizations and local bar associations can become involved in honor killing cases. The identity of victimized women needs to be protected.
* The police must establish special bureaus to prevent violence and schools should be involved in a national campaign to end the violence.
* A passage should be added to Article 10 of the Constitution
declaring that gender discrimination will not be tolerated.
4. - EUobserver - "Turkish free speech under microscope again":
8 February 2006 / by Teresa Küchler
A Turkish court on Tuesday (7 February) began hearing five prominent journalists accused of insulting the country’s courts, in a case closely watched by Brussels
The high-profile trial will test the relationship between Turkey and the EU, which has called for judicial reforms and increased rights to free expression in Turkey.
Five columnists from leading Turkish newspapers face possible jail sentences of between six months and 10 years for comments they made about a court decision to cancel a conference about the massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire during World War I.
A group of European Parliament observers is attending the courtroom in Ankara, worried about what seems to be yet another attempt to curb freedom of expression by the Turkish government.
The trial begins only weeks after the controversial trial of award-winning novelist Orhan Pamuk, accused of "public denigration of Turkishness", a case described as a litmus test of Turkish commitments to liberty of expression, was dropped.
Mr Pamuk, whose case drew heavy attention from international media had been charged by prosecutors after telling a Swiss paper in an interview "30,000 Kurds and one million Ottoman Armenians were killed in Turkey and no-one dares to talk about it."
An Istanbul court however referred the case to the justice ministry which had to rule on whether it was in accordance with a new penal code, adopted by Turkey in the run-up to the opening of accession talks with the EU last October or not.
Turkish justice minister Cemil Cicek rejected responsibility for the case, prompting the court to drop the charges.
Defenders of free speech in and out of Turkey on the starting day of the latest trial, said that the Pamuk case has not been fully dealt with, opening up the possibility for a series of similar cases.
"This resolution of the Pamuk drama does not really bring a lot of resolution to the other cases, because nobody really stood up for freedom of expression," a European diplomat told media outside the court in Ankara.
Brussels watching the use of 301
The columnists have been prosecuted under Article 301 of the Turkish penal code which forbids Turkish citizens from denigrating the Turkish identity, the Republic, the Grand National Assembly, the government, the judicial branches or the military.
Human rights organisations, intellectuals and the commission have expressed concern at the frequent referral by Turkish authorities to Article 301, to prosecute human rights defenders, journalists and other members of civil society peacefully expressing dissenting opinions.
Late last year human rights watchdog Amnesty International reported that there are over 60 pending cases of journalists, writers and other intellectuals who have spoken against the inviolable institutions mentioned in Article 301.
The European Commission has urged Ankara to revise Article 301, saying it does not safeguard freedom of expression in its current form.
Enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn in December urged the Turkish government to make it clear to the country's prosecutors and judges that Article 301 of the new penal code should be interpreted fully in line with the European Convention of Human Rights.
"Considering the number of recent prosecutions, it appears that the new Penal Code does not provide sufficient protection for the freedom of expression", he added.
At the court in Ankara on Tuesday, dozens of nationalist Turks protested against EU pressure on Turkey to make provisions for more rights to freedom of speech.
The judge ordered two nationalist lawyers who had pushed
for the trial against the journalists to be removed after a fight in
the courtroom, according to Turkish media.
5. - DIHA - "Response In Kurdish, For The Punishment To Kurdish Language":
URFA / 6 February 2005
Ayse Gokkan, who is the member of IHD (Human Rights Association in Turkey) Branch from Urfa and a writer in the Azadiya Welat magazine, made a response to her punishment, which was given to her because of talking in Kurdish in the congress of HADEP and DEHAP, with explaining this in Kurdish.
Ayse Gokkan who made a press statement in IHD in Kurdish, said that this punishment is contrary to international agreements.
Gokkan, who made a press statement in IHD Urfa Branch
in Kurdish, talked like this; "Every individual talks in his/her
mother tongue in the world. Mother tongue is the basic principle of
Human Rights. This right can not be bereaved from the individual with
any law. It is a right that you have congenitally. It was accepted in
the Universal Agreement of Human Rights, which was signed also by Turkey".
6. - IWPR - "Ethnic tensions rising in Kirkuk":
The province of Kirkuk - home to about a million Kurds, Turkoman, Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans and Armenians - is a powder keg waiting to explode.
6 February 2006 / by Samah Samad
Marwa As’ad, a Turkoman resident of Kirkuk, is heartbroken. She
had been planning to marry a local Kurdish man but her family broke
off the engagement after her brother was carjacked by a Kurd.
She believes rising tensions among different ethnic and religious groups in Kirkuk contributed to her break-up. Like many others interviewed in this ethnically and religiously diverse city, As’ad said the atmosphere has deteriorated since Saddam Hussein's regime was overthrown in April 2003.
The province of Kirkuk - home to about a million Kurds, Turkoman, Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans and Armenians - is sometimes referred to as a little Iraq or as Iraq's melting pot, but some believe the area, in particular the city of Kirkuk, is a powder keg waiting to explode.
The situation has worsened since Iraq changed from a one-party dictatorship under Saddam's Ba'athist regime, maintain local leaders and residents. Political parties in Kirkuk, most of which represent ethnic or religious groups, are battling for control of the city and its surroundings.
While there are no reliable statistics on the ethnic and religious make-up of the province, Kurds are believed to be the largest ethnic group. Indeed, Kurdish slates won five of Kirkuk's nine parliamentary seats in the December elections, and they hold the most seats on the provincial council.
Saddam had tried to reduce the Kurdish majority in the area by moving significant numbers out of Kirkuk city and replacing them with mainly poor Arabs from the south.
But now Kurds are fighting to bring Kirkuk city back under Kurdish political control. The move isn't popular among its other communities who effectively control certain neighbourhoods, which are adorned with often-confrontational flags and banners.
"You see many provocative slogans such as 'Long live
Turkoman;
'Long live Mam Jalal' (a reference to Iraqi president and Kurdish leader
Jalal Talabani); or 'Kirkuk is an integral part of Kurdistan',"
said Omar Muhammad, a 29-year-old Arab resident.
Muhammad said the problem grew worse during parliamentary elections, and that political parties have fuelled sectarianism.
On January 29, several car bombs went off near churches in Kirkuk, killing one person.
Silvana Buya Nassir, a Chaeldan Assyrian, said Christians were concerned about safety prior to the bombings.
"We used to hold evening ceremonies to pay tribute to Christ, but because of the deteriorating security situation and violence against our group, we have to do it during the day," she said.
"The tension has forced many families to emigrate and seek asylum in European countries to escape this terrible situation."
Ali Mahdi, vice president of Turkoman Iliy party, accused Kurdish parties of fomenting division by working only for their own interests and demanding the city return to Kurdish control.
"They are following the same path as the Ba'ath regime to create hatred and differences among Kirkuk's people to the extent that it has affected daily relations between people," he said. "They are responsible for planting the seeds of segregation in Kirkuk."
But Kurds themselves are also falling victim to the growing tensions.
Waleed Ali, a 30-year-old Kurd from Hawija in southern Kirkuk province, moved to Kirkuk city's suburbs after several Kurds were killed by Arab militants, although local Arab tribesmen insisted the killers had no connection with their community.
"I lived in Hawija for 30 years, but after the fall of regime their views towards us changed. They accused the Kurds of helping the Americans to topple Saddam," said Ali.
Just as Kurds are blamed for helping the Americans, some in Kirkuk now equate Arabs with Ba'athists. "They hold us accountable for what Saddam and his regime did, as if all Arab people participated in those acts," said Sami al-Ne'mi, a 32-year-old Arab.
Kurdish leaders in the area insist that they are not behind the tensions. "We don't differentiate between ethnic groups," said Nasreen Khalid, a Kurdish member of Kirkuk provisional council. "We work for the interests of all of Kirkuk's people."
Khalid insisted that bonds between groups are much stronger than they were in the past. "Contrary to claims by some factions and satellite channels that civil war will break out in Kirkuk, coexistence is strong here," she said.
But local observers are not so sanguine. “There is no peaceful coexistence among ethnic groups as is claimed by politicians and the media," said Muhammed al-Jabar, a sociologist." As different governments have come to power (after Saddam's regime) and different policies have been laid down, mistrust has been created among the different groups and tensions are rising."
"The policies of the political parties and sectarianism have infiltrated everything," said As'ad. "It even affects family relationships, like what happened to me. We hoped for so many years for democracy and freedom to come to us, and this is the price we are now paying."